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and Norwegian School of Economics
Torben Pedersen
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Foreign subsidiaries in multinational corporations (MNCs) possess knowledge that has different 
sources (e.g., the firm itself or various sources in the environment). How such sources influence 
knowledge transfer is not well understood. Drawing on the “accommodation effect” from 
cognitive psychology, the authors argue that accumulation of externally sourced knowledge in 
a subsidiary may reduce the value of transferring that subsidiary’s knowledge to other parts of 
the MNC. The authors develop a parsimonious model of intrafirm knowledge transfer and test 
its predictions against a unique data set on subsidiary knowledge development that includes the 
sources of subsidiary knowledge and the extent of knowledge transfer to other MNC units. The 
authors show that a high level of externally sourced knowledge in a subsidiary is associated with 
a high level of knowledge transfer from that subsidiary only if a certain tipping point of 
internally sourced knowledge has been surpassed. This suggests that subsidiary knowledge 
stocks that are balanced in terms of their origins tend to be more valuable, congruous, and 
fungible, and therefore more likely to be transferred to other MNC units.
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Various management literatures have argued that knowledge transfer between 
organizational units may serve to build knowledge-based competitive advantages (e.g., 
Argote & Ingram, 2000; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). In particular, a large segment of the 
international business literature argues that multinational corporations (MNCs) can derive 
advantages relative to purely domestic firms from their superior access to heterogeneously 
distributed knowledge (e.g., Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1986) and their ability to 
transfer and exploit such knowledge within the MNC (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1993; Teece, 
1977). The organizing framework in this literature has been that of the “bathtub metaphor” 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Decarolis & Deeds, 1999; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; 
Doraszelski, 2003), suggesting that firms and subsidiaries can be seen as possessing 
proprietary stocks of knowledge (like water in a bathtub) and that these stocks may be 
affected by (in and out)flows of knowledge, such as those caused by R&D, interfirm 
spillovers, and knowledge “depreciation.” This view of knowledge has been a powerful 
workhorse on which a vast body of important and influential research has been built.
The basic approach in this research stream has been to implicitly assume organizational 
knowledge stocks to change in a cumulative manner. The implication is that firms and their 
subunits accumulate knowledge, as long as their inflows are larger than their outflows, and 
thereby increase the economic value of their knowledge stocks.1 This view contrasts with 
the psychology literature, which has emphasized that knowledge—unlike water in a 
bathtub—consists of multiple dimensions and elements that change one another. Different 
knowledge elements may even be in mutual conflict because they are based on dissonant 
cognitive schemas (Festinger, 1957). For example, when recipients acquire new knowledge 
that conflicts with their existing beliefs, they may inadvertently alter their existing knowledge 
structures—a process that cognitive constructivists call “accommodation” (Dole & Sinatra, 
1998). In the context of the MNC, this may lead a foreign subsidiary to alter or discard 
preexisting knowledge that happened to be valuable to other MNC units. This implies that 
knowledge inflows from the environment may be value destroying, an effect that cannot be 
captured if we assume knowledge to be cumulative. A subsidiary’s increased absorption of 
knowledge from its external environment may therefore lead to less, rather than more, 
knowledge transfer to the rest of the MNC when accommodation to the knowledge sourced 
from the external environment impedes the subsidiary’s coherence with the rest of the MNC.
Knowledge in MNCs is to a large extent distributed across subsidiaries (e.g., Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Hedlund, 1986). 
Knowledge heterogeneity arises partly because subsidiaries build knowledge assets, such as 
technological competencies, from different sources. For example, some subsidiaries may 
rely more on knowledge sourced from their local environments in the process of building 
valuable subsidiary-level knowledge (“external knowledge”), whereas others might build 
knowledge assets based on knowledge inputs from other subsidiaries or corporate 
headquarters (“internal knowledge”; see Frost, 2001). Such heterogeneity suggests that 
subsidiaries may differ not only in their ability to receive and utilize knowledge from their 
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external environments (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989) but also in the amount of knowledge that 
they are able to successfully transfer to other subsidiaries within the MNC (Wong, Ho, & 
Lee, 2008). We argue that a foreign subsidiary needs to possess a certain minimum level 
(a “tipping point”) of knowledge received internally from other MNC units, for the rest of 
the MNC to benefit from the transfer of knowledge that the subsidiary acquires from its 
external environment.
We operationalize and test these ideas using a unique data set on foreign subsidiaries 
including information on stocks and flows of technological knowledge. Our findings suggest 
that the acquisition and exploitation of externally sourced knowledge are processes that are 
strongly related to the characteristics of the knowledge controlled by individual organizational 
units. Although our results relate directly to the current MNC literature, they have 
implications in more general settings. In particular, although we show that the MNC’s 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990) is dependent on the knowledge 
characteristics of its individual organizational units, this argument is likely to apply to 
national firms as well.
Determinants of Knowledge Transfer  
in the Multinational Corporation
The notion that knowledge is a fundamental driver of value creation has become a key 
tenet in the strategic management literature (e.g., Barney, 1991; McEvily & Chakravarthy, 
2002) as well as in the MNC literature (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991, 1994, 2000; Hedlund, 
1986; Kogut & Zander, 1993). Knowledge resources (e.g., production know-how) may be 
particularly strong drivers of value creation in MNCs because they can be transferred to 
overseas subsidiaries that do not yet possess them, yielding significant scale and scope 
economies across the MNC network. The MNC is viewed as a network of geographically 
separate but mutually linked nodes (or units), each possessing unique knowledge resources 
(Ambos, Ambos, & Schlegelmilch, 2006; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Ghoshal & Nohria, 
1989; Håkanson & Nobel, 2001). Possibilities for combining complementary knowledge 
resources, and for supporting their transfer and subsequent combination, drive overall value 
creation (Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005; Yang, Mudambi, & Meyer, 2008).
At the same time, anecdotal evidence tells us that even intra-MNC knowledge transfer 
can be a source of managerial challenges. For example, when Acer America developed the 
Aspire, it encountered significant knowledge transfer barriers in its attempt to coordinate and 
leverage the innovation throughout the rest of the Taiwanese PC maker’s global organization, 
which was hesitant to take directions from the U.S. subsidiary (Bartlett & St. George, 1998). 
In general, the basic premise of much of the recent MNC literature—namely, that knowledge 
resources controlled by subsidiaries are heterogeneous—implies that intra-MNC transfer 
costs may vary depending on the characteristics of the transferred knowledge and the 
receiving unit (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1993) and that the economic value of knowledge may 
be highly heterogeneous among different units within MNCs. This suggests that the amount 
of knowledge residing in a subsidiary is in itself of less importance than the dimensions of 
knowledge heterogeneity in determining the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer. 
1400   Journal of Management / September 2013
Therefore, we need to consider these more subtle dimensions of knowledge heterogeneity to 
capture the cost and benefits of knowledge transfer. We argue that an understanding of these 
dimensions requires us to take one step further back and examine the sources of subsidiary 
knowledge heterogeneity.
Sources of Subsidiary Knowledge and Net Benefits of Knowledge Transfer
Subsidiary knowledge may originate from different sources (Frost, 2001). From the 
perspective of a focal unit, knowledge may derive from sources that are internal to the MNC 
in the sense that it has been transferred to the subsidiary from other MNC units (i.e., other 
subsidiaries or headquarters). For example, internal customers, suppliers, or R&D units may 
provide the subsidiary with the know-how it needs to perform its various functions in the 
firm. Alternatively, subsidiary knowledge sources can be external to the MNC.2 For 
example, firms may acquire knowledge from interaction with external parties, such as host 
country customers or suppliers (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Ford, 1990), or they may gain 
knowledge inputs from a well-educated workforce or local research institutions, such as 
technical universities, in industrial clusters (Porter, 1990; Porter & Sölvell, 1998).
Consider a focal foreign subsidiary that possesses a stock of technological knowledge, 
which may be either internally or externally sourced or some combination thereof. For 
example, it may possess blueprints and tacit knowledge elements that are a mixture of 
knowledge acquired from technical universities in its host country and from internal R&D 
labs in MNC units in other countries. This combination, in turn, affects the costs and benefits 
of transferring that knowledge from the subsidiary to other MNC units, including corporate 
headquarters and other foreign subsidiaries. Knowledge transfer benefits exist if economic 
value is created by transferring some of the knowledge resources of the focal subsidiary to 
other units within the MNC (e.g., if these receiving units can use it to produce and sell a 
technologically advanced product to their local customers at high margins). At the same 
time, however, knowledge transfer may be costly (Teece, 1977). A variety of economic and 
cognitive factors—namely, a lack of absorptive capacity (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), distrust 
of the transferred knowledge (Katz & Allen, 1982), lack of retention on the part of the 
receiving unit (Szulanski, 1996), sending units’ lacking competence with respect to 
transferring knowledge (Martin & Salomon, 2003), low fungibility (Teece, 1982), and low 
congruity of the transferred knowledge with the knowledge held in the receiving unit 
(Schulz, 2003)—drive the costs of knowledge transfer (e.g., efforts to encode and decode the 
knowledge or costs of transportation and rotation of knowledge-bearing employees). There 
will be an incentive for MNE managers to facilitate such knowledge transfer only if the 
expected benefits of transferring the knowledge exceed these costs. We use formal notation 
to discuss how the marginal costs and benefits ( and  ) of knowledge
transfer are related to the levels of internally sourced knowledge (henceforth called “internal 
knowledge” and denoted I) and externally sourced knowledge (“external knowledge,” or E) 
in the subsidiary, and how that ultimately affects the level of knowledge transfer from the 
subsidiary (K).3 Such a formalization is useful as it enables us to be more precise and explicit 
about our assumptions (Oxley, Rivkin, & Ryall, 2010) and, subsequently, to deduce an 
empirical prediction from them and operationalize the model for econometric testing.
∂ ∂ ≡C K C
K
/ ∂ ∂B K B
K
/ º
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The uniqueness of external knowledge. Research indicates that unique knowledge may 
develop in the periphery of the firm’s knowledge structure (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 
2002; Lyles & Schwenk, 1992; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). Related research shows that 
external knowledge in foreign subsidiaries may be valuable to MNCs (Doz, Santos, & 
Williamson, 2001; Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002; Ghoshal, 1987). For example, the 
MNC may take advantage of interfirm spillovers of technological knowledge (Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993) that are captured by subsidiaries, or extract knowledge 
from sophisticated customers and skilled competitors by having specialized subsidiaries in 
strategic locations (Asmussen, Pedersen, & Dhanaraj, 2009; Dunning, 1996; Porter, 1998). 
The Acer Aspire is a case in point—being designed by a local Silicon Valley firm called 
Frog Design, championed by an American product manager, and shaped by extensive inputs 
from local retailers and consumers (Bartlett & St. George, 1998). External knowledge of this 
kind is likely to be different from the knowledge of other MNC units because geographical 
proximity is conducive to knowledge spillovers (Jaffe et al., 1993) and most of the potential 
MNC recipients reside in other locations where they do not have proximate access to the 
knowledge environment of the focal subsidiary.4
In contrast, internal knowledge is likely to somewhat overlap with preexisting knowledge 
in a potential receiving unit because both sender and recipient have previously received their 
knowledge from some of the same sources (such as MNC headquarters or other subsidiaries). 
Thus, internal knowledge, when transferred, may be relatively redundant in the context of 
the knowledge already possessed by the receiving unit. We thus argue that the uniqueness 
of the subsidiary’s knowledge in an MNC context tends to be larger, ceteris paribus, if that 
knowledge is acquired in the subsidiary’s external host country environment rather than 
from other MNC units. This enhances the benefit of knowledge transfer as it may stimulate 
innovation by increasing diversity of knowledge in the receiving unit (Page, 2007).
Knowledge fungibility. Although the preceding analysis suggests that external knowledge 
increases marginal knowledge transfer benefits (formally, BKE > 0), other forces pull in the 
opposite direction. In particular, the value of transferring the knowledge of the subsidiary 
depends not only on the uniqueness of that knowledge but also on the degree to which it is 
specialized to its originating location. For example, production blueprints from a focal 
subsidiary may indeed be valuable to overseas MNC units, which can use them to manufacture 
products for their local customers—but only to the extent that the customers in those 
countries actually value the product described by the blueprint. This idea was first proposed 
by Teece (1982), who defined the fungibility of a resource as the extent to which the resource 
retains its value when applied in increasingly distant markets. Hence, highly fungible 
resources are those generalized, firm-specific capabilities that could potentially be used in a 
wide variety of markets (Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). In an MNC 
context, the fungibility of the subsidiary knowledge stock should be an important determinant 
of the benefits of knowledge transfer.
Rugman and Verbeke (1992) stress the interaction of geographic distance and fungibility 
by distinguishing between location-bound (nonfungible) and non-location-bound (highly 
fungible) firm-specific advantages. Several factors may contribute to making a knowledge 
resource location bound. Often receiving units are poorly positioned to exploit knowledge 
simply because they are distant from the customers, suppliers, partners, or competitors for 
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whom the knowledge was developed. This suggests that external knowledge is likely to be 
more difficult to apply in other MNC units, precisely because it has a more peripheral origin. 
It is less fungible than internal knowledge because it relates specifically to host country 
conditions and is, therefore, more context specific. External knowledge may therefore in fact 
be associated with lower benefits (BKE < 0) and increased costs (CKE > 0) of knowledge 
transfer.
Knowledge congruity. Furthermore, even if a focal subsidiary’s knowledge is highly 
fungible, it is not certain that potential recipient units possess the necessary complementary 
knowledge to absorb and utilize it (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This suggests that there is 
another aspect, in addition to the economic applicability of the knowledge to recipients’ 
markets, that matters to knowledge transfer benefits—a cognitive aspect that we refer to as 
the congruity of the subsidiary’s knowledge stock. Schulz (2003) noted that the relevance of 
a given knowledge stock to its recipient was a function of the extent to which the knowledge 
is related to and connected with the preexisting knowledge in the receiving unit. Consistent 
with that idea, we define knowledge congruity as the cognitive fit between the knowledge 
stocks of the focal subsidiary and those of potential recipients of that knowledge (e.g., HQ 
or a subsidiary in another location). One important antecedent to knowledge congruity is the 
combination of sources from where the knowledge of the subsidiary originates. If the 
knowledge originates within the MNC, it is likely to be reasonably congruous with that of a 
receiving MNC unit because both units have previously received their knowledge from some 
of the same sources and thereby have a foundation of shared knowledge on which to build. 
Conversely, external knowledge may be so far removed from the realities of the receiving 
unit that the personnel in this unit may not realize its value or fungibility or possess the 
necessary tacit complementary knowledge to exploit it (Yang et al., 2008) since the contexts 
of the sending and receiving subsidiaries differ. In other words, the receiving unit may not 
possess the relative absorptive capacity to utilize the external knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Therefore, even if the knowledge reaches the 
intended recipient, it may lie dormant in that unit without being exploited to its full commercial 
potential, suggesting that BKE < 0 also for this reason.
Similarly, the congruity of the subsidiary’s knowledge with the knowledge held in the 
recipient units may influence the costs of knowledge transfer. If the knowledge stock is 
mainly internal, the overlap between the knowledge of the sender and recipient units is likely 
to be high. This implies low knowledge transfer costs (Reagans & McEvily, 2003): As the 
two units hold a certain amount of knowledge in common, less codification should be 
required because the transferred knowledge is easily recognized and understood and fewer 
costly misunderstandings occur. In contrast, external knowledge elements are likely to have 
fewer overlaps with other knowledge assets in the MNC. Therefore, even though other MNC 
units might benefit from this knowledge, their relative absorptive capacity to assimilate it is 
limited (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In turn, this means that the 
encoding and decoding of this knowledge may require more effort and the need for face-to-
face contact may be higher. These factors suggest that the costs of knowledge transfer will 
be higher if the subsidiary possesses more external knowledge (CKE > 0), an effect that 
compounds the effects of external knowledge on transfer benefits and reinforces its effects 
on fungibility.
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Assimilation and accommodation as responses to external knowledge. Although the 
above arguments suggest an unambiguous amplifying effect of external knowledge on 
knowledge transfer costs, they offer conflicting predictions as to the effect of external 
knowledge on knowledge transfer benefits. In essence, external knowledge may make the 
focal subsidiary’s knowledge more unique and less applicable at the same time. The notion 
of a negative relationship between external knowledge and knowledge transfer benefits 
deserves elaboration as it may at first seem counterintuitive: How can more knowledge 
possibly lead to lower knowledge transfer benefits? Indeed, the tendency in the economics 
and management literatures is to see organizational knowledge stocks as cumulative, so that 
they can be augmented by acquiring additional external knowledge that stacks on top of the 
preexisting knowledge and adds to the value of that knowledge. Cognitive psychologists use 
the term assimilation to describe such a process, where recipients incorporate the learned 
knowledge into their existing knowledge stocks, which in turn are left largely unchallenged 
(Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). Under knowledge assimilation, we would never 
expect to see a negative relationship between external knowledge and knowledge transfer 
benefits. In the worst case, acquired nonfungible and incongruous external knowledge would 
merely fail to increase knowledge transfer benefits further, but it should not destroy the 
benefits of transferring the subsidiary’s remaining knowledge, which would still be there, 
largely intact and valuable.5 Therefore, there would always be, at worst, a flat relationship 
between external knowledge and marginal knowledge transfer benefits, so that BKE ≥ 0.
However, the cognitive psychology literature also recognizes that assimilation is only 
one part of the learning process and that a fundamentally different reaction pattern, called 
accommodation, may also occur in knowledge recipients (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Vosniadou 
& Brewer, 1987). In the process of accommodation, the acquisition of new knowledge 
makes the recipients alter some of their existing knowledge structures. This process is 
described in detail in the psychology literature as pertaining to individuals (e.g., Piaget & 
Brown, 1985), and accommodation to host country knowledge may thus happen in 
subsidiary individuals such as country managers and R&D personnel. However, we suggest 
that it is likely to also be embedded on a higher level—the foreign subsidiary itself—since 
organizational learning “results in associations, cognitive systems, and memories that are 
developed and shared by members of the organization” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985: 804). 
Furthermore, even though accommodation is to some extent a natural part of the learning 
process in individuals, it may be problematic in the MNC context because acquired host 
country knowledge may lead subsidiaries to reinterpret and, possibly, discard internal MNC 
knowledge. Cognitive elements (whether at the individual or subsidiary level) may instead 
be infused with host country norms for what are best practices (e.g., What is considered a 
superior technology?) and host country perceptions of causal relationships (e.g., What 
determines the performance of a complicated product?). This could make the knowledge 
less congruous with and fungible for potential MNC recipients who do not share these 
norms and perceptions and thereby lead to lower knowledge transfer. This suggests a 
possible explanation for Acer’s problems, where units outside of the United States struggled 
with manufacturing the Aspire (suggesting low congruity of the American innovation with 
the rest of the MNC) and felt compelled to make significant and cost-increasing adaptations 
to it for their own markets (suggesting low fungibility). Effectively, there is a risk that the 
dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) of the subsidiary moves closer to that of its 
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knowledge sources in the host country and further away from the dominant logic of the 
MNC. Therefore, the internal legitimacy of the subsidiary may be reduced because of the 
trade-off between internal and external legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This may lead 
to increased subsidiary isolation and thus to reduced knowledge transfer, as pointed out by 
Monteiro, Arvidsson, and Birkinshaw (2008).
Interaction of internal and external knowledge. As a result of the contrary effects of 
assimilation and accommodation, it is ambiguous how the external knowledge resources 
controlled by a subsidiary will affect the benefits of transferring knowledge to other MNC 
units. If the subsidiary merely assimilates external knowledge, more external knowledge can 
never be directly detrimental because the knowledge, at best, can be profitably exploited by 
receiving units and, at worst, is worthless to these units. In that case, we would expect that 
BKE ≥ 0. On the other hand, if external knowledge causes accommodation to take place in the 
subsidiary’s internal knowledge stock, which thereby becomes less congruous and fungible, 
a negative relationship between external knowledge and marginal knowledge transfer 
benefits may exist, because the composite knowledge of the subsidiary becomes less 
applicable in receiving units, that is, BKE < 0.
We argue that accommodation to external knowledge is more likely in subsidiaries that have 
low levels of internal knowledge, whereas subsidiaries with high levels of internal knowledge 
either reject new external knowledge or assimilate it by reshaping it to fit their existing internal 
knowledge structures. Hence, the interaction of external and internal knowledge is related to 
knowledge transfer benefits, such that the subsidiary’s “own internal know-how will increase 
the marginal returns to external knowledge acquisition strategies” (Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2006: 68). There are three ways in which this can happen. First, for external knowledge to be 
combinable with knowledge in other MNC units, it has to be interpreted and formulated in such 
a way that it can be accessed by other units (Grant, 1996). This requires internal knowledge and 
may increase the congruity and fungibility of the subsidiary’s composite knowledge stock. In 
the absence of this interaction with internal knowledge, external knowledge may generate 
lower benefits in other parts of the MNC because it is too distant from the recipients’ preexisting 
knowledge. In other words, they may lack the absorptive capacity and the complementary 
knowledge to exploit it (as seemed to be the case for Acer’s market units in other regions). In 
contrast, having both internal and external knowledge in the technological knowledge stock of 
the subsidiary would be an ideal basis for intrafirm knowledge recombination (Ahuja & Katila, 
2001) because the knowledge of the originating subsidiary is then neither too similar to the 
knowledge held by potential receiving units nor too different from it.
Second, internal and external knowledge resources can be complementary, so that they 
can be combined into a more valuable composite knowledge resource and subsequently 
transferred to other MNC units. A subsidiary might thus be able to combine technological 
stimuli from its host market with the proprietary technologies of the MNC before it transmits 
this knowledge to other MNC units. Arguably, if the U.S. subsidiary of Acer had possessed 
sufficient internal knowledge, it may have been able to push Frog Design to develop a 
product that fit not only with emerging consumer tastes but also with the manufacturing 
capabilities of Acer’s global organization.
Third, if the subsidiary possesses internal knowledge, it may be better able to screen the 
external environment (Arora & Gambardella, 1994; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989), enabling it 
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to acquire external knowledge that is more fungible and congruous, and thereby more 
relevant to MNC recipients, in the first place. Internal knowledge can thereby empower the 
subsidiary as a “listening post” for the MNC—a role in which “receiver competence (assessing, 
filtering, and choosing information) and absorptive capacity (adapting inflows to fit firm-
specific requirements) become crucial” (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004: 389). Taken together, 
these three mechanisms suggest a positive interaction between internal and external knowledge 
in the determination of the benefits of knowledge transfer, so that BKEI > 0.
As a highly stylized example of this process, consider a subsidiary that possesses a 
knowledge element A. Furthermore, suppose this knowledge element is fungible and 
congruous and (in the absence of more external knowledge) would therefore be associated 
with knowledge transfer benefits. What would happen if the subsidiary then increases its 
external knowledge level by acquiring a host country knowledge element B and combining 
it with A? If it has sufficient internal knowledge, it will reinterpret this new knowledge in 
the MNC context, in turn making both A and B useful to other units (an assimilation process 
leading to a positive relationship between external knowledge and knowledge transfer 
benefits). If the subsidiary has only a moderate level of internal knowledge, it may not be 
able to reinterpret the new knowledge in the MNC context and B may therefore be useless 
to other units (while A is still useful, leading to a flat relationship). Finally, if the subsidiary 
possesses low levels of internal knowledge, it may be so vulnerable to external influence that 
the new knowledge B leads it to inadvertently reinterpret A in a way that is specific to the 
host country (perhaps by discarding aspects of A that are unrelated to the local technologies 
embodied in B). This accommodation process decreases the usefulness of A to other MNC 
units. In that case, an increase in external knowledge actually leads to a decrease in 
knowledge transfer benefits.
Predicting Knowledge Transfer
The theoretical framework sketched out thus far describes the extent to which knowledge 
transfer may create costs and benefits for the MNC. We can generate predictions of actual 
levels of knowledge transfer by asking what happens if subsidiary and MNC managers are 
responsive to these costs and benefits, in other words, by submitting knowledge transfer to 
a “logic of consequences” (March, 1996: 283). If for now we treat the knowledge stock of 
the subsidiary (I and E) as exogenous, we can find the best level of knowledge transfer for 
any given level of internal and external knowledge. To do this, we solve for the level of 
knowledge transfer (denoted K*) that maximizes the net benefits from knowledge transfer 
(denoted NB):
 (1)
The first- and second-order conditions for this maximization problem are as follows:
 (2)
max ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
K
NB K E I B K E I C K E I= −
NB K E I B K E I C K E I
K K K
( *, , ) ( *, , ) ( *, , )= − = 0
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These conditions will be fulfilled if the marginal net benefits from knowledge transfer at 
some point begin to diminish and eventually reverse. Arguably, this is a reasonable assumption: 
At some point, either the benefits from further knowledge transfer are exhausted or the costs 
become prohibitive (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989).6
For any given level of E, then, there will be a K* that satisfies Equation 2, and we can 
say that this equation therefore implicitly defines K* as a function of E. We use this feature 
to derive comparative statistics that show how changes in external knowledge levels affect 
the optimal level of knowledge transfer. By applying the implicit function theorem (see, e.g., 
Chiang, 1984: 208) to Equation 2, we arrive at,7
 (4)
As much of the literature identifies external knowledge as a source of MNC competitive 
advantage (Doz et al., 2001; Porter & Sölvell, 1998), one may be tempted to hypothesize that 
higher levels of external knowledge lead to more knowledge transfer, so that Equation 4 is 
positive. However, the denominator of Equation 4 is positive by virtue of the second-order 
condition, so the sign of K*E actually depends on the sign of the numerator BKE–CKE, which is 
indeterminate because of the dual impact of assimilation and accommodation.8 Still, the 
assumption that BKEI > 0 implies that d(BKE) / dI > 0 and therefore also that d(BKE–CKE) / dI > 0 
which, combined with Equation 4, implies that K*EI > 0. This is our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The interaction between the internal and external knowledge in a subsidiary is 
positively related to the level of knowledge transfer from that subsidiary to the rest of the MNC.
Based on this interaction effect, we can arrive at a conditional prediction of the 
relationship between external knowledge and knowledge transfer. If K*EI > 0, a sufficiently 
high level of internal knowledge will, ceteris paribus, increase the likelihood that the 
marginal benefits of external knowledge will be positive and also the likelihood that they 
will outweigh the marginal costs of that knowledge. This implies that there may exist a 
knowledge tipping point—a level of internal knowledge in a subsidiary that must be 
exceeded if the MNC is to benefit from knowledge that originates from that subsidiary’s 
external environment. We define this tipping point (denoted Іˆ ) as the level of subsidiary 
internal knowledge at which external knowledge becomes marginally valuable to the MNC, 
such that BKE–CKE < 0 for all I < Іˆ , BKE–CKE > 0 for all I > Іˆ , and BKE–CKE = 0 for I = Іˆ . By 
Equation 4, then, at levels of internal knowledge below this tipping point, K*E will be 
negative, whereas at higher levels it will be positive. This is captured by our main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between external knowledge and knowledge transfer will be 
positive if the internal knowledge of the subsidiary lies above a certain tipping point, Іˆ ; 
otherwise, this relationship will be negative.
Operationalizing the model. How can such a tipping point be estimated from actual data? 
To make the model amenable to empirical testing, we adopt the simplest polynomial 
NB K E I B K E I C K E I
KK KK KK
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B C
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*
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approximation that fulfills our theoretical assumptions. This enables us to write the net 
benefit of transferring knowledge out of subsidiary j,
 (5)
where g and b are parameter vectors with g3 > 0 (because of the complementarity between I 
and E) and g4 > 0 (diminishing marginal net benefits
9), tj is a vector of observed subsidiary-
specific variables that affect the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer, and µj captures the 
net effect of all unobserved subsidiary-specific variables that affect these costs and benefits.10 
The first-order condition for this model is given by,11
 (6)
which can be solved for a prediction of K*j:
 (7)
In this expression, γi ≡ gi / 2g4, tj represents the control variables, and 
1––2g4 µj is a subsidiary-
specific intercept. If we denote the mean value of this intercept as ϕ, and the difference 
between the individual subsidiary’s intercept and this mean as ε1j, the expected value of ε1j is
0 and . Substituting this into Equation 7 yields an equation that has the 
advantage that it lends itself to direct empirical testing by regression analysis:
 (8)
We can now estimate the level of internal knowledge that is required if external 
knowledge is to be beneficial. This level can be estimated by asking what level of I would 
ensure that (K*)E > 0:
12
 (9)
Thus, the level of internal knowledge has to be above –γ1 / γ3 before external knowledge 
has a positive effect on the knowledge transfer out of the subsidiary. This tipping point can 
be estimated with data on E, I, and K.
Endogenous regressors. Although we have treated internal and external knowledge as 
exogenous variables in our framework, they could in fact be endogenous if MNC managers 
are simultaneously determining where to locate their subsidiaries, what knowledge to source 
internally and externally, and how much of that knowledge will be transferred. Therefore, if 
we estimated Equation 8 using ordinary least squares (OLS), we would run the risk of 
obtaining biased results and, consequently, a biased tipping point. In principle, if we could 
identify and observe all variables affecting K, we would be able to control for these variables 
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and thereby solve the endogeneity problem (controlling for observables). However, in 
practice, we cannot a priori rule out the presence of unobserved variables that may affect 
both I and E, as well as K. For example, suppose that the disturbances ε1j were created by 
unobserved subsidiary-specific variables—such as tacit knowledge management capabilities—
that affect both knowledge levels and knowledge transfer. In that case, I, E, and ε1j would 
be positively correlated (because they are affected by the same unobserved capabilities), 
which would lead to inflated estimates of γ in Equation 8 and thereby to a biased estimate 
of the tipping point in Equation 9.
To correct this problem, we can replace the actual values of the endogenous regressors 
with instrumental variables or, preferably, with predicted values based on multiple instruments 
(Kennedy, 2003). First, we add the following two equations to our model,
 (10)
 (11)
where εj are disturbances and nj and aj are exogenous variables that are expected to influence 
internal and external knowledge acquisition, respectively (described below). Together, 
Equations 8, 10, and 11 constitute a recursive system of simultaneous equations. If the 
disturbance terms εjK are correlated, as they will be if there are unobserved variables affecting 
all three endogenous variables (Greene, 2008), then OLS coefficients would be biased (as 
revealed by a Hausman test of endogeneity). A better estimation method in that case is two-
stage least squares (2SLS), in which the endogenous regressors I and E are regressed on all 
of the exogenous variables in the first stage and their predicted values (which, unlike the 
actual values, are uncorrelated with ε1j) are used in Equation 8 in the second stage. Finally, 
one may apply seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to the 2SLS results to allow the error 
terms of the three equations to correlate in a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model (Zellner 
& Theil, 1962).
Empirical Analysis
Data Collection
The data for this article were collected mainly as part of the Centres of Excellence 
Project, which engaged researchers in the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Portugal, and Canada (see Holm & Pedersen, 2000). The project was launched 
to investigate headquarter–subsidiary relationships and the internal flow of knowledge in 
MNCs. To collect comparable quantitative data on the acquisition of subsidiary knowledge, 
it was decided to construct a questionnaire that could be used in all of the countries involved. 
This was accomplished after several project meetings and extensive reliability tests of the 
questionnaire with academics and business managers.
For practical reasons, all project members were responsible for gathering data on foreign-
owned subsidiaries in their own country. Therefore, all subsidiaries in the database belong 
to MNCs. The data were gathered from subsidiary managers rather than headquarters. One 
I
j j j
= + +η η ε
0 2
’n
E
j j j
= + +α α ε
0 3
’a
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Table 1
Sample Overview of Subsidiaries
Host Country of Subsidiaries
MNC Home Country Austria Denmark Finland Germany Norway Sweden United Kingdom Total Sample
Response rate (%) 28 41 24 21 22 55 20 30
No. of subsidiaries 313 308 238 254 262 530 202 2,107
Share of manufacturing 
subsidiaries (%)
65 79 70 95 65 71 86 75
Average subsidiary age 18 17 13 20 15 16 18 17
Share of greenfield 
investments (%)
61 29 44 30 52 39 42 42
Average number of 
employees
318 284 200 1,574 130 244 3,787 742
Average sales (million 
USD)
61 57 50 465 63 74 377 142
Average share of 
subsidiary’s purchases 
coming from other 
MNC units (%)
22 13 16 10 17 20 11 16
Average share of 
subsidiary’s sales 
going through other 
MNC units (%)
7 7 4 9 3 5 5 5
advantage of using subsidiary respondents is that they are directly engaged in the operations 
on the market and are, therefore, more acquainted with the characteristics of the host country 
environment. Although any subsidiary might be expected to have a reliable awareness and 
understanding of its own knowledge resources, it would be advantageous to gather 
information on intra-MNC knowledge flows from other corporate units as well. However, 
identifying the appropriate subsidiaries in each country and then identifying and approaching 
relevant management units in the foreign subsidiaries would be an unmanageable task.
Description of the Data
Our analysis is based on data from seven countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. All countries are located in the northern part of 
Europe. The four Nordic countries are relatively small, whereas Germany and the United 
Kingdom are among the largest in Europe. Approximately 80% of the questionnaires were 
answered by subsidiary executive officers, whereas financial managers, marketing managers, 
or controllers in the subsidiaries answered the remaining 20%. The overall response rate was 
30%, and the quality of the data was relatively high—the general level of missing values was 
not greater than 5%. Table 1 shows the sample properties segmented by country. Country 
variations emerge in the response rates, which ranged from 20% (in the United Kingdom) to 
55% (in Sweden), and in the sizes of the subsidiaries, which tended to correlate with the 
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Table 2
Distribution of Home Countries for MNCs
Host Country of Subsidiaries
MNC Home Country
Austria 
(%)
Denmark 
(%)
Finland 
(%)
Germany 
(%)
Norway 
(%)
Sweden 
(%)
United 
Kingdom (%)
United States  10  16  20  31  17  20  33
Germany  45  17  10 —   8  13  11
Sweden   8  21  29   3  24 —   5
Switzerland  11   6   6  15   6  10   6
United Kingdom   5  11   8  11   8  11 —
France   5   6   6   7   6   5   6
Netherlands   3   6   4  10   2   5   4
Denmark   1 —   7   1  12   9   2
Finland   1   3 —   2  10  10   1
Japan   2   2   0   5   3   4  13
Other   9  12  10  15   4  13  19
Total no. of subsidiaries per host 
country
313 308 238 254 262 530 202
 % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
sizes of the host countries and with subsidiary age. In general, the Nordic subsidiaries were 
younger and smaller than subsidiaries in other countries.
The sample covers 2,107 subsidiaries and composes all types of subsidiaries in all fields 
of business. However, 75% of the subsidiaries conduct manufacturing activities across the 
seven countries. The average number of employees in the subsidiaries was 742, with a median 
of 102. Average annual subsidiary sales were US$142 million. The share of subsidiary sales 
going through other MNC units was on average 5%, whereas the average share of purchases 
coming from other MNC units amounted to 16%. The average subsidiary age at the time of 
the survey was 17 years. Of the subsidiaries, 42% were established as greenfield investments, 
whereas the remaining 58% were acquisitions. The sample size per country ranged from 202 
(United Kingdom) to 530 (Sweden), and the sample sizes were generally similar, with the 
exception of Sweden. The average size of the subsidiaries in the five smaller countries was 
similar, whereas subsidiaries in Germany and the United Kingdom, because of the larger size 
of those markets, were substantially larger.
Table 2 lists the distribution of MNC home countries for the 2,107 subsidiaries that are 
the focal unit of analysis for this study. There are some notable differences in the dominant 
MNC home country for subsidiaries in the seven host countries. Of the foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in Austria, 45% and 11% are German and Swiss owned, respectively, whereas 
Swedish owners are dominating among the foreign-owned subsidiaries in Finland (29%), 
Norway (24%), and Denmark (21%). MNCs from the United States control a prominent 
share of foreign-owned firms in all seven countries but are particularly dominating in the 
United Kingdom (33%), Germany (31%), and Sweden (20%). Japanese MNCs seem to 
control only minor shares except in the United Kingdom, where 13% of the foreign-owned 
subsidiaries have Japanese owners.
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Measures
Data were collected both from secondary sources and through the questionnaire. Some 
items in the latter, such as the number of employees, were measured using actual values, 
whereas most variables are multi-item measures that were measured using 7-point Likert-
type scales.13
Survey measures have both advantages and disadvantages compared to patents, which 
have become a popular way to operationalize knowledge transfer (see, e.g., Singh, 2007). 
On one hand, survey measures can capture transferred knowledge that is used in final 
products or processes in the recipient units, whereas patent citations cannot pick up 
knowledge transfer unless the recipient unit itself engages in innovative activity and takes 
out a patent in which citations can appear. Also, unlike patent data, perceptual data are 
suitable for capturing tacit as well as codified knowledge (Kaiser, 2002), and it is relatively 
industry agnostic (Archibugi & Pianta, 1996). On the other hand, it is well known that 
survey data may contain measurement errors that violate econometric assumptions because 
of social desirability and other respondent biases (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001). We have 
assessed and addressed the possibility of such biases in a number of ways in our study. First, 
to detect potential common method bias problems in the data (i.e., the risk that the 
correlations between variables might be inflated), we performed Harman’s single-factor test 
for all dependent and independent variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 
2003), but found no indication of such a bias. Following Podsakoff et al. (2003), we also ran 
a partial least squares (PLS) model, which included a common method factor whose items 
encompassed all of the constructs’ items. This PLS model provided information on each 
item’s variances, substantively explained by the constructs and by the common method 
factor. The average substantively explained variance of the items is between 0.59 and 0.69 
for the different models, whereas the average method-based variance is around 0.01. The 
ratio of substantive variance to method variance is, therefore, very high, which indicates that 
the potential common method bias is relatively small. In combination, these statistical tests 
suggest that our results are not driven predominantly by common method bias, especially as 
our main hypotheses are based on a moderating effect, which is rather unlikely to emerge 
exclusively as a result of such bias (Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010; Siemsen, 
Roth, & Oliveira, 2010).
Finally, as explained below, we also attempt to control statistically for error covariances 
with our instrumental variables 3SLS model. All in all, although these precautions do not 
eliminate the threat of potential biases stemming from the use of survey data, they do raise 
the hope that such biases have been largely contained.14 The next sections describe the 
measurement of the individual variables in our data set.
Knowledge transfer. Davenport and Prusak (1998) argue that knowledge transfer involves 
not just the transmission of knowledge but also the practical application and use of the 
knowledge by the receiver. Accordingly our measure of (successful) knowledge transfer 
captures the use of the subsidiary knowledge in other MNC units. The subsidiaries were 
asked about the extent to which technological knowledge under their control had been of use 
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to other MNC units on a 7-point Likert-type scale, where 1 was defined as to no use at all 
for other units and 7 was defined as very useful for other units. The transfer of technological 
knowledge was measured in terms of the average usefulness of three types of knowledge, 
research (basic and applied), development (of products and processes), and production (of 
goods and services), and this scale showed acceptable reliability with Cronbach’s alpha = .65.
Internal knowledge. The “internal knowledge” construct captures the knowledge 
developed through interaction with other MNC units. To measure the knowledge inputs from 
other MNC units, respondents were asked to assess the impact of various internal 
organizations on the development of the subsidiary’s competences, where 1 equaled no 
impact at all and 7 equaled very decisive impact. Internal technological knowledge was thus 
measured as the impact of internal MNC R&D units on the subsidiary’s competences.
External knowledge. The “external knowledge” construct (i.e., subsidiary-level knowledge 
built mainly from external knowledge inputs) captures the importance of external parties. 
The inputs from external partners were measured by asking respondents to assess the impact 
of various external organizations on the development of the subsidiary’s competences, 
where 1 equaled no impact at all and 7 equaled very decisive impact. External technological 
knowledge was then measured as the impact of external R&D units on the subsidiary’s 
competences.
Predictors of internal knowledge. As predictors of internal knowledge in Equation 10, we 
include a number of variables suggested by theory. First, we obtained measures of subsidiary 
dependency, which captures the extent to which the focal subsidiary is dependent on 
knowledge from other MNC units. It was measured by asking respondents, “What would be 
the consequences for the subsidiary if it no longer had access to the competencies of other 
MNC units?” (1 = no consequences and 7 = very significant consequences). We believe that 
a subsidiary that perceives itself as being highly dependent on other MNC units would also 
be more motivated to receive knowledge from these units. Second, we included the 
subsidiary’s mode of formation (0 = greenfield, 1 = acquisition). We would have liked a 
more fine-grained measure including, for example, information about joint venture partners, 
but this information was not available. We nevertheless believe our dummy variable 
captures an important distinction: A subsidiary that is acquired as an independent firm and 
subsequently integrated into the MNC may be more reluctant to receive knowledge from its 
parent and other subsidiaries than one that is designed and staffed by the MNC from 
inception, for example because of the not-invented-here syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
Third, we included the age of the subsidiary (in years), which captures the duration of time 
the subsidiary has been exposed to MNC policies and internal knowledge. Arguably, internal 
knowledge may be more readily absorbed when the subsidiary has well-developed channels, 
routines, and organizational structures for exchanging information with other units, and 
building such an infrastructure is subject to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989). The passing of time itself may also enable employees to become more strongly 
identified with the firm and develop trust in the internal network, which facilitates internal 
knowledge acquisition.
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Predictors of external knowledge. Extant research has suggested several factors that may 
influence subsidiary acquisition of external knowledge. In particular, host country 
characteristics have been shown to be important predictors of subsidiary innovation 
(Almeida & Phene, 2004). We obtained several measures to gauge these characteristics and, 
especially, the quality of the knowledge in the external business environment, which might 
enhance the external technological opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989) of the 
subsidiary. First, we constructed measures of science per capita for each host country in 
which our subsidiaries are located. This was calculated as the number of scientific and 
technical journal articles published in the relevant host country (sourced via the World 
Development Indicators database from the World Bank), normalized by dividing with the 
population of each country. Second, although knowledge environments differ from country 
to country, they also vary across localities and industries within a country (Porter, 1990). We 
therefore also used Porter’s (1990) diamond model as a more fine-tuned measure of location 
effects. We asked respondents for their assessment of cluster factors along the following 
dimensions: availability of business professionals, availability of supply material, quality of 
suppliers, level of competition, government support, legal environment, and existence of 
research institutions (1 = very low quality and 7 = very high quality). Porter’s (1990) 
emphasis on the holistic nature of the model and the high intercorrelation between many of 
the items motivated us to construct a composite index (Cronbach’s α = .67). These cluster 
factors extend the science per capita measure as they contain both country-specific effects 
and industry-specific effects and some level of interaction between them. Third, we asked 
the respondents to evaluate the institutional environment in the host country. If institutional 
conditions are perceived as favorable, the subsidiary may be more willing to open up and 
engage actively with the surrounding environment, for example, collaborating with host 
country partners, without an expectation of disputes or intellectual property appropriation. 
This, in turn, would lead to better opportunities for external knowledge sourcing.
Knowledge transfer control variables. Finally, when predicting knowledge transfer in 
Equation 8 we included a number of variables related to the role of the subsidiary in the 
MNC network. When a subsidiary has a mandate as a strategic asset-seeking unit (Dunning, 
1993), a competence-creating subsidiary (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005), or a center of 
excellence (Frost et al., 2002; Holm & Pedersen, 2000), its knowledge is likely to be formally 
and informally recognized and valued by headquarters, by other units, and by subsidiary 
employees. This, in itself, may encourage the subsidiary to transfer more knowledge 
regardless of its actual knowledge levels. We therefore controlled for the MNC’s formal 
recognition of and dependency on the knowledge residing in the subsidiary, as well as the 
subsidiary’s own investments in and assessments of its competences. Formal recognition 
was measured by asking whether the indicated competencies of the subsidiary were formally 
recognized by the MNC headquarters. Respondents could answer yes or no to the following 
three activities: research, development, and production (the sum of which measured formal 
recognition of technological knowledge, from 0 to 3).
The MNC dependency on the knowledge of the focal subsidiary was measured using the 
following question: “What would be the consequences for other units in the foreign company 
if they no longer had access to the competencies of the subsidiary?” (1 = no consequences 
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and 7 = very significant consequences). The subsidiaries’ own investments were measured 
by asking respondents to assess the level of investments in the subsidiary in the past 3 years, 
where 1 = very limited and 7 = substantial. Like formal recognition, the level of investments 
was assessed for the three technological activities (and averaged to determine investments 
in technological knowledge; Cronbach’s α = .69). In a similar way, the subsidiaries’ own 
assessment of their technological knowledge was captured by asking respondents to indicate 
the level of subsidiary competencies for these same activities (on a 7-point scale; Cronbach’s 
α for assessment of technological knowledge = .71). The subsidiaries vary in size, and their 
ability to absorb and exploit knowledge might be related to size, for example, in terms of 
employees. Therefore, we included a size measure of logarithm of total number of subsidiary 
employees as a control variable. Finally, we controlled for geographic distance with a 
dummy variable measuring whether the parent MNC was headquartered in Europe.
The correlation coefficients and descriptive data (mean values, standard deviations, and 
normality statistics) on all variables are provided in Table 3.
The bivariate correlations between knowledge transfer and both internal and external 
knowledge are positive and highly significant. Five control variables (MNC dependency, 
formal recognition, own competencies, subsidiary investments, and subsidiary employees) 
are also positive and significantly related to transfer of knowledge. Surprisingly, the sixth 
control variable, EU headquarters, seems not to be related to any of the other variables in the 
data set. It is also noticeable that none of the correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables indicate the possibility of multicollinearity (i.e., r > .5). Our dependent variable, 
knowledge transfer, has a low mean (about 2), which implies technological knowledge that 
has been of low to moderate use to other units, but the standard deviation and skewness 
suggest a long right tail. This suggests that a substantial number of subsidiaries indicate that 
their knowledge is of no use at all to other units (1), whereas a few see their knowledge as 
more or less useful (2–6) or even very useful (7). In fact, 101 subsidiaries (about 5% of the 
sample) answered either 6 or 7 on the 7-point Likert-type scale. This is surprising but could 
be interpreted as an indication of a “star system” pertaining to reverse knowledge transfer, 
where a few subsidiaries claim a disproportionate share of top management attention 
(Blomkvist, Kappen, & Zander, 2010). Finally, we can see from Table 3 that internal 
knowledge (mean of about 2.9) seems to be more important to the subsidiaries than external 
knowledge (2.1), perhaps reflecting barriers that subsidiaries with limited absorptive 
capacity face when sourcing knowledge from their host markets.
Evaluation of Instrumental Variables Approach
To address the problem of endogeneity through an instrumental variables approach, one 
would need an instrument (or set of instruments) that is correlated with the endogenous 
variable but that is not correlated with the error from the regression in which the endogenous 
regressor appears (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). From an a priori theoretical perspective, 
it seems likely that the “objective” instruments in our model—science per capita, subsidiary 
age, and formation—pass this test. Since the former is at the country level and collected 
outside the survey instrument and the latter two variables are irreversibly set at the founding 
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of the subsidiary, it is unlikely that they will be significantly influenced by the current 
knowledge structures and organizational arrangements in the subsidiary. This means that 
they work as plausibly exogenous instruments. On the other hand, our perceptual instruments—
cluster factors, institutional environment, and subsidiary dependency—may be less obvious 
candidates for instrumental variables. We believe that host country characteristics should be 
largely exogenous to the knowledge processes in an individual subsidiary since they exist 
independently of the subsidiary context. Subsidiary dependency does not, but it has the 
attractive property (for an instrument) that it is theoretically more strongly related to the 
accumulation of internal knowledge in the subsidiary than to the level of knowledge transfer 
out of the subsidiary (since it captures only one direction of the power relationships between 
the subsidiary and its peers). Still, if only because all three measures are perceptual, we 
cannot completely rule out the risk that they are at least simultaneous to the process that 
drives knowledge transfer, as would happen for example if there were unobserved 
capabilities that influenced both knowledge transfer and respondent perceptions.
From an a posteriori empirical perspective, nevertheless, there seems to be limited 
evidence of such a problem. Judging from Table 3, almost all instrumental variables 
predicting internal and external knowledge (Variables 4 to 9) are much more strongly 
correlated with their corresponding knowledge type (2 or 3) than they are with knowledge 
transfer (1). The weakest instrument seems to be cluster factors (for E), whereas the strongest 
ones seems to be subsidiary dependency (for I) and science per capita (for E). More 
importantly, however, is that they work well as a group, explaining an acceptable 13% to 
15% of the variance in the endogenous regressors (as reported in Table 5). Furthermore, to 
test for overidentifying restrictions, we regress the residual from the knowledge transfer 
equation on the instruments for the model (Sargan, 1958). The R-squared value in this 
regression is very low (.0045), and none of the predictors are statistically significant. 
Basmann (1960) independently developed a method that is computationally different from 
but similar in spirit and asymptotically equivalent to the Sargan test (Kirby & Bollen, 2009). 
This test also led us to reject the hypothesis of a significant relationship between instruments 
and residuals (F = 0.78, p = .67), which is a quite strong result considering the size of our 
sample, which directly scales the test statistic. We also inspected the bivariate correlations 
between instruments and residuals, all of which were insignificant and close to 0. In 
combination, these tests do not provide absolute proof of the absence of endogeneity, but 
they do suggest that the problem has been addressed in our model.
Results
We did not mean-center our independent variables around 0, as this approach would 
complicate the interpretation of the tipping point—our focal interest—without improving the 
stability of the estimated coefficients (Echambadi & Hess, 2007). The Hausman test for 
endogeneity implied that the OLS estimates did indeed suffer from endogenous regressors 
(test statistics = 39.92, p < .001). This suggests the use of either 2SLS or 3SLS as a remedy 
against endogeneity bias. The main benefit of 3SLS is that it is asymptotically more efficient 
than 2SLS and thereby yields more precise parameter estimates in large samples if the error 
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Table 4
Three-Stage Least Squares Models and Incremental F Tests
Dependent Variable: Transfer of 
Technological Knowledge
Model 1: 
Controls Only
2: Controls and 
Direct Effects
3: Controls, Direct 
Effects, and Interaction
Internal technological knowledge — –0.08 (0.05) –0.29** (0.07)
External technological knowledge — –0.07 (0.08) –0.38** (0.12)
Internal technological knowledge × 
external technological knowledge
— — 0.11** (0.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
R2 .55 .58 .68
Adjusted R2 .54 .57 .66
Incremental F (df) — 75.0** (2) 328.0** (1)
Note: N = 2,107. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are suppressed (but 
shown in Table 3 for the final model).
**p < .01.
terms are correlated; in fact, “the performance of 3SLS always bests that of 2SLS as the 
sample size increases indefinitely” (Belsley, 1988: 29). This benefit has to be weighed 
against the potential drawbacks of 3SLS, which are that it is more computationally 
demanding and that it increases the severity of potential misspecification biases by allowing 
these to “contaminate” the whole system of equations (Zellner & Theil, 1962). We ultimately 
choose 3SLS because (a) we have a large sample that allows us to leverage the asymptotic 
efficiency of 3SLS and (b) the correlation of the error variances in our model cannot be 
ignored (in fact, they vary between .07 and .38), which means that the estimates would be 
less accurate if we restrict them to 0, as 2SLS implicitly does. We suspect that these error 
covariances may stem from the previously described measurement error in our survey data. 
We therefore refer to the 3SLS estimates (although they are very similar to the 2SLS 
estimates) in the following.
Although all exogenous variables were used to predict internal and external knowledge 
in the first stage, we report only the main (third-stage) predictors of these two variables in 
the interest of conciseness and clarity. Our results are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
To evaluate the impact of the hypothesized variables, we ran a series of models that were 
hierarchically nested within another, in the sense that each new model was obtained by 
adding explanatory variables to the previous one. The results of this process are reported in 
Table 4. Model 1 included only the control variables in Equation 8; Model 2 added the direct 
effects of the independent variables, and Model 3 also included the interaction effect. As 
demonstrated by the R-squared values in the table, the control variables explained 55% of 
the variation in knowledge transfer, whereas the direct effects explained an additional 3% 
and the interaction effect an additional 10%. The strong explanatory power of our control 
variables is not unexpected given their high correlation with knowledge transfer and their 
strong conceptual link to this variable, and it suggests that we have adequately controlled for 
other factors besides our hypothesized variables. In comparison, the limited explanatory 
power of the direct effects alone, and their insignificant coefficients in Model 2, may at first 
seem surprising. However, it becomes clear that this apparent insignificance conceals an 
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Table 5
Three-Stage Least Squares Model for Technological Knowledge
Dependent Variable
Internal 
Technological 
Knowledge
External 
Technological 
Knowledge
Transfer of Technological 
Knowledge
Subsidiary dependency 0.31** (0.02) 0.31
Formation 0.44** (0.06) 0.11
Logarithm of subsidiary age 0.43** (0.03) 0.19
Institutional conditions 0.18** (0.02) 0.16
Assessment of cluster factors 0.28** (0.02) 0.12
Science per capita 4.55** (0.98) 0.05
Internal technological knowledge –0.29** (0.07) –0.30
External technological knowledge –0.38** (0.12) –0.30
Internal technological knowledge × 
external technological knowledge
0.11** (0.03) 0.60
MNC dependency 0.16** (0.02) 0.15
Formal recognition of technological 
knowledge in subsidiary
0.81** (0.03) 0.44
Assessment of own technological 
competencies
0.05* (0.02) 0.03
Subsidiary investments in 
technological knowledge
0.41** (0.02) 0.37
Logarithm of subsidiary employees 0.08** (0.02) 0.07
HQ in Europe –0.03 (0.06) –0.01
Adjusted R2 .68
First-stage R2 .15 .13
Note: N = 2,107. Instrumented values of internal and external knowledge are based on all exogenous variables. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and standardized beta estimates (how many standard deviations the 
dependent variable changes for each standard deviation change in the independent variable) are listed in italics.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
omitted variable bias as soon as the interaction is added. Theoretically, this means that we 
cannot say anything universal about the effect of external knowledge independently of 
internal knowledge since the direction of the impact of external knowledge is contingent on 
the level of internal knowledge.
The incremental F tests in Table 4 show that the increase in R-squared resulting from 
each new addition to the model is highly significant and suggest that we can therefore 
proceed with Model 3 for hypothesis testing. Table 5 shows the full model with all three 
equations and control variable coefficients. Overall, the equation system works well with 
many significant variables and reasonably high R-squared values. The instruments for 
internal and external knowledge are all significant and explain 13% to 15% of the variation 
in those variables. The standardized beta coefficients indicate that subsidiary age and 
dependency are the most important predictors of internal knowledge and that the perceptions 
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of the host country environment in terms of cluster factors and institutions have the strongest 
impact on external knowledge. Conversely, although science per capita is highly significant, 
its effect on external knowledge is smaller, perhaps because this measure (unlike the 
perceptual ones) implicitly aggregates the technological environment up to the country level 
and thereby fail to capture knowledge spillovers on a more localized level (Jaffe et al., 
1993). Among the control variables in the knowledge transfer equation, formal (MNC) 
recognition of subsidiary knowledge and subsidiary investments are the most important 
judging from the standardized estimates—one standard deviation change in each of these 
variables is associated with a change in knowledge transfer of 0.44 and 0.37 standard 
deviations, respectively. This indicates, as expected, that a high level of knowledge 
accumulation in a subsidiary is associated with a high level of knowledge transfer to the rest 
of the MNC network. Having European headquarters has no effect on knowledge transfer, 
suggesting that the subsidiaries are able to transmit technological knowledge over long as 
well as shorter distances.
Our two hypotheses are tested by the coefficients on the two knowledge sources and their 
interaction, which is marked in bold in Table 5. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the positive 
and significant coefficient of the interaction effect, as well as by the significant incremental 
F-test reported above. With a standardized beta of 0.60 and an increase of 0.10 in 
R-squared—almost three times the increase provided by the direct effects alone (cf. Table 4); 
this interaction clearly has strong explanatory power in our model. This suggests that the 
complementarity between internal and external knowledge is crucial to building fungible 
competences on a subunit level and that failing to account for this complementarity would 
seriously obscure the mechanisms behind knowledge transfer.
Hypothesis 2 expresses the idea that the accumulation of external subsidiary knowledge is 
associated with knowledge transfer only when internal knowledge is above a certain tipping point, 
as suggested by our theoretical discussion of accommodation and assimilation. The hypothesis 
is evaluated by applying Equation 9 to the estimated coefficients on external knowledge
and the interaction effect, leading to an estimated tipping point of ,
which supports the hypothesis. Figure 1 visualizes the tipping point and the impact of 
external and internal knowledge on technological knowledge transfer.
The tipping point is shown as a dotted white line where the relationship between external 
knowledge and knowledge transfer “tips” from a negative to a positive one. A segmentation 
of our sample subsidiaries around this point illustrates the managerial implications of our 
results. Only 34% of the subsidiaries in our sample have reported a level of internal 
knowledge above (in Figure 1, to the right of) this tipping point; these subsidiaries can be 
considered potential scanning units or centers of excellence for external knowledge sourcing. 
This leaves the remaining majority of the subsidiaries (66%) who have internal knowledge 
below the tipping point (to the left of the dotted line). The more external knowledge these 
subsidiaries possess, the less they tend to transfer to the rest of the MNC. Although we 
cannot directly observe the cognitive processes going on in these subsidiaries, this result is 
consistent with accommodation taking place. The configuration that is least conducive to 
knowledge transfer is (I,E) = (1,7), whereas the most conducive is (I,E) = (7,7), and going 
from the former to the latter is associated with an increase in knowledge transfer of almost 
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Figure 1
Tipping Point (Іˆ  = 3.8) for Marginal Value of External Knowledge
3—sufficient to turn a completely isolated subsidiary into a subsidiary whose knowledge is 
in fact moderately useful to other MNC units.
As a post hoc estimation, we conducted an ANOVA analysis on the two groups of 
subsidiaries clustered by the tipping point, namely those above the tipping point (I > 3.8) and 
those below the tipping point (I < 3.8). Table 6 reports the results of this analysis, which 
indicates a remarkable and statistically significant difference between the two groups. In 
particular, the group of subsidiaries above the tipping point is characterized by higher 
transfer of technological knowledge, higher external knowledge, higher subsidiary 
investments, and a stronger tendency for its knowledge to be formally recognized and for the 
rest of the MNC to be dependent on this knowledge. Generally, these variables are also the 
ones that were the most significant in the 3SLS model. In contrast, there is no significant 
difference in the propensity of the subsidiaries to belong to a European MNC, as both groups 
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Table 6
ANOVA for Subsidiaries Above and Below Tipping Point
Variable
Internal Knowledge 
Below Tipping Point 
(n = 1,389)
Internal Knowledge 
Above Tipping Point 
(n = 718) F
Transfer of technological knowledge 1.8 2.5 66.7**
External knowledge 1.7 2.8 287.0**
Subsidiary investments in technological 
knowledge
2.3 2.8 51.1**
Formal recognition of technological 
knowledge
0.8 1.1 32.9**
Assessment of own technological 
competencies
5.4 5.4 1.1
MNC dependency 3.1 3.6 42.65**
Logarithm of subsidiary employees 4.6 4.8 4.48*
HQ in Europe 0.7 0.7 1.5
Note: N = 2,107.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
have 70% of their subsidiaries reporting headquarters in Europe. Also, somewhat surprisingly, 
the two groups do not differ in their assessment of own technological knowledge. This may 
indicate that merely having knowledge is not sufficient: Before a subsidiary can provide 
value to its peer units, this knowledge must be fungible and congruous in relation to the rest 
of the MNC. This is apparently quite difficult to accomplish since only one third of the 
subsidiaries in our sample have enough internal technological knowledge to achieve it.
Concluding Discussion
Contributions
This work advances our knowledge of intrafirm knowledge transfers, specifically intra-
MNC knowledge transfers, by building on two key ideas. The first one is that there is a 
meaningful distinction between knowledge in MNC subsidiaries that mainly stems from 
internal sources and knowledge that mainly stems from external sources, and that these two 
kinds of knowledge may interact. Although this idea is not new per se (Frost, 2001), our 
theoretical exploration and mathematical formulation of this idea yield new implications, 
particularly in the context of the distinction between accommodation and assimilation 
effects. Thus, we show that a sufficiently high level of internal knowledge increases (ceteris 
paribus) the likelihood that the marginal benefits of external knowledge will be positive and 
also the likelihood that they will outweigh the marginal costs of that knowledge. The 
wider ramification of this idea—which is embodied in our first hypothesis—is that 
the complementarity between internal and external knowledge is crucial to building fungible 
and congruous knowledge on a subunit level and that failing to account for this complementarity 
may hamper our understanding of knowledge transfer in MNCs.
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The second key idea is the distinction between “assimilation” (where recipients incorporate 
the learned knowledge into their existing knowledge stocks, leaving these largely intact) and 
“accommodation” (where the acquisition of new knowledge makes the recipients alter some 
of their existing knowledge structures) effects from cognitive psychology (Dole & Sinatra, 
1998; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987). Applying this distinction in the MNC context made us 
question whether external knowledge sourcing by subsidiaries is conducive to knowledge 
transfer, as accommodation effects in subsidiaries may lead to knowledge in that subsidiary 
becoming less relevant to the rest of the MNC network. This also implies the existence of a 
tipping point, that is, a level of internal knowledge in a subsidiary that must be exceeded if 
the (rest of the) MNC is to benefit from knowledge that originates from that subsidiary’s 
external environment (cf. Hypothesis 2). We identified this tipping point on the basis of data 
on external and internal knowledge and knowledge transfer from the subsidiary. Our 
findings reveal that only 34% of the subsidiaries in our sample have reported a level of 
internal knowledge above this tipping point.
Relations to the Extant Literature
In the literature, a high level of similarity between the sender and receiver of knowledge 
is often seen as conducive to knowledge transfer (e.g., Reagans & McEvily, 2003). We 
challenge this view by showing that neither a high nor a low level of similarity is associated 
with a high level of knowledge transfer. We find that an intermediate level, in which a 
combination of internal and external knowledge is present, is most highly associated with 
knowledge transfer. If the knowledge of the subsidiary is too similar to the knowledge held 
in the rest of the MNC, it may become redundant in the MNC context and be associated with 
a diminished level of potential innovation and inhibit knowledge transfer. Therefore, our 
findings are consistent with the idea of dual institutional pressures (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991), which force the subsidiary to balance its similarity to the host 
country environment with its similarity to the internal MNC environment. To the extent that 
the legitimacy obtained from such a balance enables the subsidiary to acquire knowledge 
from both the internal environment and the external environments, it would be positively 
associated with reverse knowledge transfer, according to our model. Hence, a balanced 
approach to subsidiary isomorphism is not only necessary for the subsidiary to obtain the 
resources it needs to survive but also important in the MNC context, as it increases the 
benefits that other MNC units can reap from the subsidiary’s knowledge. These benefits are 
maximized through a combination of internal and external knowledge, where enough 
overlap exists to make the transferred knowledge useful to the recipient, but not enough to 
make it redundant.15
Our study also adds to earlier research into the determinants of knowledge transfer from 
MNC subsidiaries. For example, Monteiro et al. (2008) hypothesized and found a correlation 
between internal knowledge inflows (in our model, I) and internal knowledge outflows (K). 
Although they offered organizational explanations of this correlation (reciprocity and the 
existence of internal communication channels), our explanation emphasizes the mediating 
role of the host country environment: Internal knowledge inflows in a subsidiary enable the 
subsidiary to acquire congruous and fungible external knowledge, which in turn facilitates 
Asmussen et al. / Knowledge Transfer and Accommodation Effects  1423
knowledge outflows. Our study thereby has implications for the notion of absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) in the sense that we link subsidiary-level absorptive 
capacity to overall (MNC-wide) absorptive capacity. For example, if an MNC wishes to 
establish a subsidiary “listening post” in a lead market (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004) on the 
basis of a knowledge-seeking motive (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Doz et al., 2001; 
Ghoshal, 1987) to extract knowledge from competitors and demanding customers (Porter, 
1998), it would seem helpful to install local competences in sales and marketing so that the 
subsidiary can absorb knowledge in a way that is useful for the rest of the MNC. Otherwise, 
it is conceivable that potentially relevant external knowledge fails to get transferred to other 
MNC units because of a too low level of internal knowledge. If management suspects that 
this is the case, internal knowledge may be fostered by, for example, expatriate management 
or by establishing liaison mechanisms between subsidiaries. Indeed, a lack of internal 
knowledge was eventually identified as the main reason behind the problems with the 
Aspire, reflected by Acer America’s design of a product with no standard Acer parts and 
expressed in concerns that they “didn’t understand Taiwan operations very well” (Bartlett & 
St. George, 1998: 10). Top management was ultimately able to improve on the situation by 
sending expatriate executives and engineers to the United States to increase the internal 
knowledge level of Acer America, as our model would suggest. Although our study is silent 
on the ultimate effects of knowledge transfer on MNC performance, it does suggest that the 
task of identifying and obtaining the right balance in knowledge development and acquisition 
is a difficult and, perhaps, underestimated task faced by internationalizing firms.
Implications for Future Research
This research has some limitations that we hope will be addressed in future research. 
First, we have no direct measures of the costs and benefits of knowledge transfer but infer 
them from the knowledge stocks and flows chosen by MNC managers. We do this based on 
the argument that the proportions of costs and benefits create incentives for managerial 
action. Therefore, if managers respond rationally to these incentives, a cost–benefit approach 
is both useful and powerful. Nevertheless, this is not a rejection of the importance of 
developing more realistic theories about how managers actually make decisions regarding 
MNC knowledge transfer. Such theories, which could draw on agency theory, behavioral 
theories of decision making, theories that stress legitimacy, and so on, would be a welcome 
contribution to our cost–benefit analysis.
Second, our framework is distinct in that we abstract from widely studied knowledge 
dimensions such as tacitness and complexity (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1993) and focus instead 
on the sources of subsidiary knowledge and their implications for knowledge transfer costs 
and benefits. Although this is a deliberate choice that enables us to focus on less studied, but 
important, dimensions of knowledge, we do not dispute that other dimensions also matter. 
Future studies could combine these complementary lenses on knowledge to examine the 
interaction among fungibility, congruity, tacitness, and complexity.
Third, we have relied on perceptual data to measure knowledge stocks and flows. As 
mentioned above, the strengths of survey measures are balanced by a number of weaknesses, 
such as the risk of social desirability biases. A possible avenue for future research could be 
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to try to operationalize our theoretical framework using patent data instead of or, ideally, by 
combining survey and patent measures. For example, one could measure a subsidiary’s 
internal and external knowledge by its citations to patents originating inside and outside the 
firm, respectively, while measuring knowledge transfer with a survey instrument similar to 
the one we have been using here—an approach that would at the same time eliminate any 
risk of common method bias.
Finally, the validity of our conclusions is to some extent limited by the strength of our 
instrumental variables. Although we have made every effort to control for endogeneity, and 
although no ex post statistical evidence of such endogeneity could be found in our final 
empirical model, we cannot completely rule out a risk that our estimated tipping point could 
be biased (although it is not clear in which direction such a bias would occur). It remains a 
formidable challenge for scholars of the knowledge-based view of the firm to identify 
appropriate natural or seminatural experiments that would enable us to instrument for 
organizational knowledge. In combination with our cross-sectional research design, this also 
makes it difficult to establish econometrically that the relations among knowledge types, 
complementarities, and knowledge transfer are in fact causal relations.
Nevertheless, whereas we view the idea of knowledge tipping points to be of considerable 
managerial interest, the tipping point we have estimated is in any case likely to be specific 
to our sample. The purpose of this article has not been to prescribe a given internal 
knowledge level but rather to draw attention to the possible existence of an accommodation 
effect in external knowledge sourcing and to analyze theoretically and empirically the 
implications of such an effect for foreign subsidiaries and MNCs. In fact, although we 
suspect that the existence of a tipping point is a generalizable phenomenon, the extent to 
which the location of such a point is universal is, of course, questionable. This raises 
theoretical and empirical questions of interest for MNC and international strategy scholars. 
For example, does the tipping point capture a liability of foreignness in local knowledge 
acquisition, and how does this liability vary with diversity and distance between home and 
host country? Are tipping points industry specific? And so on. Building on the approach we 
present in this article, such questions could be tackled in future research.
Notes
 1. A related line of research has conceptualized technological progress and learning as a bounded rational but 
goal-seeking search among alternatives, for example in an NK fitness landscape (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; 
Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; Levinthal, 1997). Although this approach acknowledges the multidimensional nature of 
knowledge, it still shares with the bathtub approach the assumption that knowledge is cumulative, since firms’ 
accumulated experiences are assumed to contribute to their (gradually improving) subjective maps of the landscape, 
which guide them in their continued search for ever-higher performance.
 2. Other sources of subsidiary knowledge can be identified, such as innovations developed by entrepreneurial 
subsidiary employees (Birkinshaw, 1997). Although we focus on internal and external knowledge in our theoretical 
model, we control for subsidiary-generated knowledge in our empirical model.
 3. As a convention, we use subscripts to denote derivatives in this article, as in the present definition. The only 
exceptions are (a) subscripted numbers, which denote vector members, such as a1, a2, and so on and (b) the subscript 
j, which denotes variables belonging to a given subsidiary, such as K*j.
 4. It is conceivable that a multinational corporation (MNC) could have other subsidiaries in the exact same 
knowledge environment (e.g., in the same city or industrial cluster). However, we believe this practice to be 
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relatively rare since the cost incentive to merge the colocated subsidiaries would be strong. We do not have the 
necessary fine-grained location data to test this intuition, but as anecdotal evidence we obtained data about parent 
MNC linkages for one country in our sample (Denmark). We found that only 5% of the parent firms had more than 
one subsidiary in that country and that the average number of Danish subsidiaries per MNC was 1.09. This suggests 
to us that a subsidiary’s external knowledge is relatively likely, in a stochastic sense, to be unique to the MNC.
 5. The economics and management literatures do recognize that the passage of time may destroy knowledge, 
or the value of knowledge, because of, for example, forgetting and employee turnover (Darr, Argote, & Epple, 
1995), external change (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000), ossification (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002), and so on. 
However, these processes describe knowledge outflows; knowledge inflows in themselves are almost invariably 
seen as beneficial.
 6. Although the optimum will be found in such a region of diminishing returns, this does not rule out the 
possibility of increasing returns to knowledge transfer at lower levels of K (e.g., because of learning and 
superadditivity effects as subsidiaries begin to transfer knowledge)—to find a maximum we need evaluate only the 
second-order condition at the stationary point defined by the first-order condition. Empirically, we cannot identify 
domains of increasing and decreasing returns since we lack a true performance measure, but that would be a 
valuable contribution of future studies.
 7. According to the implicit function theorem, an equation F (x,y) = 0 implicitly defines y as a function of x, 
as long as Fy ≠ 0, and with the property that dy / dx = –Fx / Fy. In the context of our model, F corresponds to NBK, 
y to K*, and x to E. Thus, the implicit function theorem tells us that Equation 2 implicitly defines K* as a function 
of E, as long as   (which is fulfilled by our assumption of diminishing net marginal 
benefits), and with the property that , as stated in 
Equation 4.
 8. Note that accommodation is intuitively necessary for the numerator to be negative. The effect of the 
subsidiary’s marginal acquisition of external knowledge is captured by BKE and CKE. If CKE > BKE, K* will fall. 
However, this is not possible under assimilation, since in that case all preexisting knowledge would be left 
unchanged by marginal knowledge sourcing and the subsidiary could therefore simply ignore any new problematic 
knowledge and still transfer the same knowledge as before (so that, at worst, BKE = CKE = 0 and K* remains flat). 
Hence, Equation 4 amplifies the previous arguments by demonstrating that not only BKE < 0, but even CKE > BKE, 
implies some degree of accommodation.
 9. This assumption (of constantly diminishing marginal net benefits) is a convenient simplification that is also 
used by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). However, it is possible to relax it by multiplying the entire Equation 5 through 
by K to get a third-degree rather than a second-degree polynomial and thereby have regions of both increasing and 
diminishing returns, as discussed in Note 5. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the maximum of such a function still 
is linear in the independent variables, as our current Equation 8.
10. Note that in this equation, gk1 captures the net effect of BKE – CKE when I = 0, and gk2 captures the net effect 
of BKI – CKI when E = 0.
11. The second-order condition, –2g4 < 0, is fulfilled by the assumption of diminishing returns.
12. This is done either by differentiating Equation 8 or by using the implicit function theorem and applying 
Equation 4 to Equation 6.
13. Note that Likert-type scales, in principle, are ordinal rather than interval scaled. However, the use of 
perceptual scales in regression is now a standard approach in the literature and has been supported by Monte Carlo 
studies. For example, according to Labovitz (1970: 515), “[A]lthough some small error may accompany the 
treatment of ordinal variables as interval, this is offset by the use of more powerful, more sensitive, better 
developed, and more interpretable statistics with known sampling error.” Similarly, Jaccard and Wan (1996: 4) note 
that “for many statistical tests, rather severe departures [from intervalness] do not seem to affect Type 1 and Type 
2 errors dramatically.” Arguably, with 7 points (rather than 5 or fewer), our scales can be expected to approximate 
intervalness quite well.
14. As an additional validity test, we were able to match U.S. Patent and Trademark Office patent data from 
the National Bureau of Economic Research database to a subset of our sample. For the Danish subsidiaries in 
pharmaceutical and electronics—the two industries with the highest patent propensities (Godinho & Rebelo, 
2006)—we calculated the average annual citations to the patent portfolio of each subsidiary that had taken out 
patents. The correlation between this patent score and the self-reported technological knowledge of the subsidiary 
was .32, which we consider reasonably high given the inevitable noise in both patent and survey data.
NB B C
KK KK KK
= − ≠ 0
dK dE K NB NB B C B C
E KE KK KE KE KK KK
* / / ( ) / ( )
*≡ =− = − − −
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15. The idea of a balanced approach is also consistent with research on MNC archetypes. Consider, for example, 
the “global” MNC described by Porter (1990), where the knowledge resources of subsidiaries are internal because 
they are all essentially transferred from corporate headquarters. In this case, the subsidiaries would gain little from 
exchanging and combining knowledge because they all have their knowledge from the same source. At the other 
extreme is the “multinational” MNC (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), in which subsidiaries are embedded in their local 
host country environments and rely on external knowledge from these environments. Although each unit might 
contribute unique knowledge to the network, this knowledge has low fungibility and low congruity to the other 
units, who would find it difficult to assimilate and utilize it in their own unique contexts. From a knowledge-based 
perspective, therefore, the ideal type of MNC has subsidiaries that draw on knowledge from their local external 
networks and on knowledge from the MNC internal network. This description can be recognized from writings 
about ideal types of MNCs, such as the “heterarchy” (Hedlund, 1986), the “transnational firm” (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1989), or the “metanational” (Doz, Santos, & Williamson, 2001).
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